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RECENT DECISIONS
Other factors of equal, or at least comparable, importance may dem-
onstrate themselves at the trial.17
In any event, the soundness of the instant ruling is patent. The
equitable process, making provision as it does for a balancing of
rights and hardships, is ample protection for the rights of defend-
ants, and ample reason for allowing plaintiff to voice his bill.
X
EVIDENCE-DELAY IN ARRAIGNMENT-ADMISSIBILITY OF CON-
FEsSIoN.--While under lawful arrest on an assault charge, the peti-
tioner was interrogated concerning a murder unconnected with the
assault. He confessed to the murder and was convicted thereof.
The federal district judge refused to permit him to testify to facts
indicative of the alleged involuntary nature of his confession. The
conviction was reversed by the Court of Appeals on the sole ground
that the confession, procured before arraignment on the murder
charge, was inadmissible. Held, modified and affirmed. Although
the trial judge's refusal to admit the petitioner's testimony was re-
versible error, failure to arraign him on the murder charge did not,
per se, render the confession inadmissible. Carignan v. United States,
72 Sup. Ct. 97 (1951).
Coerced confessions are inadmissible as evidence of guilt in both
state and federal courts of the United States.' Introduction of such
a confession into evidence clearly violates the defendant's constitu-
tional right to "due process of law." 2 However, coercion is not to
be presumed from the mere fact that a confession was obtained while
the accused was in police custody.8 The validity of a confession was
formerly tested by its voluntary nature,4 even those obtained by
planned deception remaining available to aid the prosecution's case.5
In 1943, the opinion of the United States Supreme Court in
McNabb v. United States 6 established a new rule of evidence ap-
17 For an exhaustive treatment of the factors considered by courts of Equity
in granting or denying specific performance, see Note, 65 A. L. R, 7 (1930).
1 Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S. 401 (1944) ; Chambers v. Florida, 309
U. S. 227 (1940); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936); Brain v.
United States, 168 U. S. 532 (1897); see Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S.
219, 237 (1941).
2 Ibid.
3See McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332, 346 (1943); Sparf and
Hansen v. United States, 156 U. S. 51, 55 (1895).
4 See Ziang Sun Wan v. United States, 266 U. S. 1, 14 (1924); Wilson
v. United States, 162 U. S. 613, 623 (1896).
5See Young v. United States, 107 F. 2d 490, 492 (5th Cir. 1939) ; Lewis
v. United States, 74 F. 2d 173, 177 (9th' Cir. 1934).6 318 U. S. 332 (1943).
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plicable to federal courts,7 which was not derived from constitutional
limitations. The rule has been stated thus: ". . . [A] confession is
inadmissible if made during illegal detention due to failure promptly
to carry a prisoner before a committing magistrate whether or not the
'confession is the result of torture, physical or psychological .... , "8
The defendants in the McNabb case 9 had been subjected to pro-
tracted questioning while in police custody, and prior to commitment,
in violation of a statutory provision '0 commanding production of a
prisoner before a committing magistrate without unnecessary delay.
Without ruling on the voluntary or involuntary nature of a confession
obtained in the course of this interrogation, the Court ruled against
its admissibility since it had been obtained during an illegal detention.
The Court opined that were such confessions to be countenanced, the
statute prohibiting illegal detentions would render little protection to
the harassed suspect."
Subsequently, in United States v. Mitchell,12 the Court decided
that a confession made a few minutes after arrest, was admissible
despite a subsequent illegal detention due to delay in arraignment.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for a majority of the Court, ex-
plained and distinguished the McNabb case, stating that the decisive
feature in that prosecution was the purpose of the illegal detention:
to extract inculpatory statements by means of protracted questioning
and psychological pressure.13 Thus, the inquiry shifted to the causa-
tive influence of the illegal detention. This modified version of the
McNabb rule found expression in a number of cases subsequent to
the Mitchell case. 14
A few years later the Supreme Court, in Upshaw v. United
States,15 reaffirmed the strict rule of the McNabb case. Here, the
arresting officers admittedly prolonged the period between arrest and
arraignment for the purpose of extracting a confession. 16 The delay
in commitment, for the sole purpose of obtaining a confession, was
an illegal delay and so rendered the confession inadmissible. This
was true even though the detention was not shown to have induced
the confession. Thus, it is the illegality of the detention and not its
7 ,.. . [T]his Court has, from the very beginning of its history, formu-
lated rules of evidence to be applied in federal criminal prosecutions." Id. at
341. See United States v. Reid, 12 How. 361, 363 (U. S. 1851).8 Upshaw v. United States, 335 U. S. 410, 413 (1948).
9 McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332 (1943).
20 18 U. S. C. § 595 (1946), now codified in FED. R. CRim. PROC. 5(a)
(1948).
" McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332, 345 (1943).
12322 U. S. 65 (1944).
13 Id. at 67.
14 See Brinegar v. United States, 165 F. 2d 512 (10th Cir. 1947) ; Blood v.
Hunter, 150 F. 2d 640 (10th Cir. 1945); Ruhl v. United States, 148 F. 2d
173 (10th Cir. 1945).
15 335 U. S. 410 (1948).
26 Id. at 414.
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causative influence which precludes the confession's admission into
evidence.
When the illegality alleged is an unnecessary delay in commit-
ment, in violation of Rule 5 (a), the inquiries left open by the Upshaw
case are: (1) What constitutes a necessary delay in arraignment?
(2) At what point does a delay in arraignment become an illegal
detention? The answers to these questions will vary with the facts
and circumstances of each case.17 Concededly, mere failure to ar-
raign a prisoner immediately does not render the detention illegal.
Delays varying between three's and ten"' hours have been con-
sidered not unreasonable. One of the factors to be considered is the
availability of an officer empowered to commit.20 Failure to bring
a prisoner before a committing magistrate until regular office hours
does not amount to an unreasonable delay.21 Indicating its willing-
ness to broaden the interpretation of what constitutes a necessary
delay, one court stated that a full day's delay was not unreasonable,
since such time is often necessary to verify the available facts.
22
A comparison of the prompt commitment duty imposed upon
federal officers, with the rule binding state police shows the latter
to be less stringent. Unencumbered by the McNabb rule,23 the state
court's inquiry is directed toward the coercive influence of the deten-
tion. In Gallegos v. NebraskaA a delay of twenty-five days was not
considered unreasonable, when the size of the town and its limited
facilities for commitment were taken into account.21
The McNabb rule has been criticized for its inability to meet
emergencies requiring a delay in arraignment. The problem pre-
sented in conspiracy prosecutions is an outstanding example. The
notoriety of the arraignment may prevent the apprehension of co-
conspirators and afford them an opportunity for escape.20 Moreover,
an investigation into the veracity of statements made by the accused
'17 Arkowskey v. United States, 158 F. 2d 649, 650 (D. C. Cir. 1946).
'Is Mergner v. United States, 147 F. 2d 572 (D. C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325
U. S. 850 (1945).
19 Alderman v. United States, 165 F. 2d 622 (D. C. Cir. 1947).
20 Garner v. United States, 174 F. 2d 499 (D. C. Cir. 1949).
21 Symons v. United States, 178 F. 2d 615, 620 (9th Cir. 1950). But see
Arkowskey v. United States, 158 F. 2d 649 (D. C. Cir. 1946).
22 Haines v. United States, 188 F. 2d 546, 553 (9th Cir. 1951). For an
appraisal of the broadened interpretation of what constitutes a necessary delay
in arraignment, see 100 U. oF PA. L. REv. 136, 139 (1951).23Ingram v. State, 252 Ala. 497, 42 So. 2d 36 (1949); State v. Folkes,
174 Ore. 568, 150 P. 2d 17, 25 (1944).
2472 Sup. Ct. 141 (1951). See the concurring opinion of Jackson, J.,
in which Frankfurter, J., joined. "What was there to hurry about? . . . A
small prosecuting office in a town where life is leisurely made a simple effort
to go about its duty with convenient speed." Id. at 151.
25 Gallegos v. Nebraska, 72 Sup. Ct. 141, 151 (1951).
26 Reed, J., dissenting in Upshaw v. United States, 335 U. S. 410, 436
(1948).
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often leads to the disclosure of the true criminal, and to the exonera-
tion of an innocent suspect.2 7
The wavering status of the exclusionary rule of the McNabb
case, and the varying interpretations thereof, indicate a need for a
clearer definition of its boundaries. By declining to extend the rule
to cases involving legal detention on another charge, the Court, it
is submitted, correctly delimited its application. The result is com-
mendable; the application of fixed exclusionary rules in cases where
the accused is amply protected by constitutional provisions is to be
discouraged. As stated by the Court: "An extension of a mechani-
cal rule based on the time of a confession would not be a helpful
addition to the rules of criminal evidence." 28
)X
LABOR LAW - COERCION OF RECOGNITION - JURISDICTION OF
STATE COURTS TO ENJOIN.-Plaintiff department store sought to en-
join the defendant labor union from interfering with its business by
maintaining picket lines. The alleged purpose of the picketing was
to coerce the plaintiff to recognize the defendant as the sole bargain-
ing agent of the plaintiff's employees, even though the defendant had
not been certified as such. Under the state law, it would have been
illegal for the plaintiff to recognize the defendant in this capacity
while there were conflicting claims being asserted by rival unions and
when no union had been certified by the National Labor Relations
Board.'
Special Term dismissed the complaint holding that the subject
matter falls within the purview of the National Labor Relations Act,
and that jurisdiction is thereby vested exclusively in the federal tri-
bunals. Held, reversed. The courts of New York have jurisdiction
to enjoin peaceful picketing engaged in to accomplish an unlawful
objective. The defendant's acts are not within the scope of the
National Labor Relations Act. Goodwins, Inc. v. Hagedorn, 303
N. Y. 300, 101 N. E. 2d 697 (1951).
27 Inbau, The Confession Dilemma in the United States Supreme Court,
43 Iu.. L. REv. 442, 448 (1948).28 Carignan v. United States, 72 Sup. Ct. 97, 102 (1951).
1". ... there is no denying that it would be unlawful for the plaintiff
employers to yield to a demand that they recognize the defendant union instead
of some rival labor organization as the exclusive bargaining agent . . . in
advance of a certification by the National Labor Relations Board in the pend-
ing representation proceeding." Goodwins, Inc. v. Hagedorn, 303 N. Y. 300,
305, 101 N. E. 2d 697, 699 (1951); N. Y. CoxsT. Art. I, § 17, "Employees
shall have the right to organize and to bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choosing." (italics added); N. Y. LABOR LAW §§ 703,
704(3).
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